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ARGUMENT
The

When It Found A Due Process Violation In The

Court Erred

District

Potentially Exculpatorv Evidence Without

A.

Bad

Faith

Introduction

The

district court

applied an incorrect legal standard

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-9.)

The applicable

When

value prove bad

faith.

exculpatory value.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)

dismissed this case.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)

unknown exculpatory

Here the evidence was 0f unknown

The

district court

speciﬁcally found no

Because the

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing R., pp. 197-99).)

faith.

it

legal standard requires that a defendant

claiming a due process Violation from destruction of evidence 0f

bad

Of

Loss

district court

applied an erroneous legal standard, and speciﬁcally found Sarbacher had not met his

burden of proof under the correct legal standard, the

motion

district court erred

when it granted the

t0 dismiss.

Sarbacher ﬁrst contends that the

grounds and the
(Respondent’s

state

due process standard under

(citing State V.

argument

fails

its

its

ruling

0n two

alternative

its

holding.

Speciﬁcally, he claims that Idaho has adopted a different

own

constitution than

is

the district court applied this standard.

applicable under the Fourteenth

brief, pp.

11-12

App. 1982)).)

This

(Respondent’s

Leatherwood, 104 Idaho 100, 656 P.2d 760

(Ct.

because Idaho has not adopted a different constitutional due process

standard than the Fourteenth
“alternative ground.”

WI'OIlg OHC.

based

has failed to challenge one of the alternative bases for

brief, pp. 10-13.)

Amendment, and

district court

The

Amendment, and

district court

the district court did not rule

employed only one

legal standard,

and

it

0n any

was

the

Sarbacher next argues that that the

district court

was of known exculpatory

standard because the lost or destroyed evidence
(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

This argument

is

belied

did not apply an incorrect legal

by

the record,

Which shows

value.

that the

evidence was of unknown exculpatory value.
Finally, Sarbacher argues that he did prove

bad

be afﬁrmed as having reached the right result even
(Respondent’s

brief, pp. 15-21.)

argument Will be addressed in

B.

The

District

This argument

Court Employed

An Erroneous

488 U.S. 5 1 58
,

States held that “unless a criminal defendant can

failure to preserve potentially useful

Since

it

was decided,

Youngblood decision.”

fails

it

and the

applied a

district court

wrong

should

legal standard.

under the law and the

Each

facts.

turn.

In Arizona V. Youngblood,

of law.”

if

faith

Legal Standard

(1 988), the

show bad

Supreme Court ofthe United

faith

0n the part of the

police,

evidence does not constitute a denial of due process
“[t]he Idaho

appellate courts

[have]

followed the

State V. Casselman, 141 Idaho 592, 595, 114 P.3d 150, 153 (Ct.

App. 2005). The Idaho appellate courts have never held

that the

due process safeguards

guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution require a standard other than Youngblood.
applying a standard other than Youngblood, the

By

district court erred.

Sarbacher argues the Idaho Court of Appeals held in State

V.

Leatherwood, 104

Idaho 100, 656 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1982), that the Idaho Constitution requires a due process
standard other than set out in Youngblood, and therefore,
district court articulated

unchallenged 0n appeal.
withstand scrutiny.

an alternate

state constitutional

(Respondent’s

brief, pp.

by quoting Leatherwood,
ground for

10-13.)

its

the

holding that

is

This argument does not

In Leatherwood, decided six years before

applied the Fourteenth

Amendment due process

Youngblood}

standard applicable t0 situations Where the

government suppressed evidence of known exculpatory value, as articulated
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Leatherwood, 104 Idaho

at

The Br_ady standard was applicable Where “the nature 0f

known

to

make

oprpeals

the Idaho Court

a meaningful determination of materiality.”

Brady

in

V.

101-03, 656 P.2d at 761-63.

the evidence

“The

I_d.

was sufﬁciently

instant appeal falls

within the ambit 0f cases where the nature of the evidence lost or destroyed can be
established indirectly

by other evidence or testimony.”

Li. at 103,

evidence destroyed in Leatherwood was recordings ofphone calls
co-defendant t0 police dispatch, but the content 0f those calls was

Who
had

656 P.2d

at 763.

The

made by Leatherwood’s

known because “the man

overheard the telephone calls in the restaurant testiﬁed as to What [the co-defendant]
said.” Li. at 101,

656 P.2d

at 761.

The Court oprpeals speciﬁcally said the Br_ady standard is not applicable
such as the present one, Where “the nature of the evidence

lost or

destroyed

and cannot be established indirectly by other testimony 0r evidence.”
at 763.

If the nature

I_d.

is

unknown,

at 103,

of the evidence cannot be independently established,

it

in cases,

656 P.2d

would be

“necessary t0 focus primarily upon the reasonableness of the government’s conduct.” Li.

Such a focus 0n the government’s actions
adopted a few years

1

later.

E

is

entirely consistent with the

bad

faith standard

State V. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 67, 156 P.3d 565,

568 (2007)

The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that some Idaho cases that predate
Youngblood articulated a slightly different, three-prong due process test for destruction 0r
loss of evidence, but since Youngblood was decided the Idaho courts have “followed the
Youngblood decision.” Casselman, 141 Idaho at 594-95, 114 P.3d at 152-53. This
adoption 0fthe Youngblood standard t0 replace the prior three-prong standard is addressed
in more detail in subsection D, below.

(“Bad

faith is

more than mere negligence” and

“refers to a calculated effort t0 circumvent”

the duty t0 disclose exculpatory evidence (internal quotation omitted».

not stand for the proposition that good faith

0f destroyed 0r

lost

Leatherwood does

not the relevant standard Where the nature

is

evidence cannot be ascertained through other evidence, only that the

Br_ady standard applied under the facts 0f that case.
In addition, the court in Leatherwood

that

it

was applying

made

it

clear

by applying

the due process standard 0f the Fourteenth

the Br_ady standard

Amendment.

Its

only

statement about the Idaho Constitution was: “Although the Idaho Supreme Court has not
yet had occasion t0 [determine if the Br_ady rule applies under state due process standards],

we presume that a similar rule would inhere in the due process

clause of Art.

1,

§ 13,

Idaho

Constitution.” Li. at 101-02, 656 P.2d at 761-62. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the

Idaho Constitutional due process standard

is

different

from the Fourteenth Amendment

standard.

Nor

is

there anything in the district court’s order t0 suggest

standard other than Br_ady. The district court speciﬁcally stated
standard.

(R., p. 198.)

It

also cites Leatherwood, in

applied the Br_ady standard. (R., p. 198.)
that

it

was applying a

The

it

it

was applying any

was applying

the Br_ady

which the Idaho Court of Appeals

district court

gave n0 indication whatsoever

state constitutional standard different

than the federal due process

standard. (R., pp. 198-99.)

Sarbacher’s argument that the district court articulated and applied a state due

process standard different from the federal due process standard, and that

afﬁrmed

for this alternate holding, is meritless.

it

should be

C.

The Evidence Was Of Unknown Exculpatorv Value
Sarbacher argued to the

types 0f evidence:

DNA

district court that

he was deprived 0f three exculpatory

Within the truck, evidence to impeach the arresting ofﬁcer’s

testimony regarding what type of rivets were holding the substituted

VIN

plate,

and

evidence regarding Whether the truck had been “hotwired.” (R., pp. 161-72.) Sarbacher
presented n0 evidence showing there was

any such

DNA

evidence would show.

DNA evidence on 0r near the VIN plate 0r what

(Appellant’ brief, p. 5.)

evidence of what rivets were in fact holding the

VIN plate, and n0

were other than as described by the ofﬁcer. (Appellant’s

no evidence

that the truck

was not

normal key ignition. (Appellant’s

started

Sarbacher presented n0
evidence that the rivets

brief, p. 6.)

Sarbacher presented

by use of an aftermarket switch

brief, pp. 7-8.)

rather than the

Thus, the evidence in question

is,

at best,

only potentially useful to the defense. “[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith

0n the part 0f the

police, failure t0 preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute

a denial of due process 0f law.” Arizona V. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 5 1, 58 (1988). Because

Sarbacher also did not show bad faith ((R.,

bad

faith

on the part of the

State”)), there

p.

199 (“the Court does not ﬁnd

was no due process

this

an act of

Violation.

Sarbacher argues “an examination of the condition and appearance of the

modiﬁcations t0 the truck, particularly the rivets and the ignition system, would undermine
0r contradict the ofﬁcer’s testimony and the State’s case.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 13.)

T0

support this claim he cites to the district court’s restatement of Sarbacher’s claims of Why

he wanted access to the truck and the

district court’s

statements that “the condition of and

alleged physical alterations t0 the vehicle comprise the circumstantial foundation of the
State’s case.”

(Respondent’s

brief, p. 13 (citing R., pp. 161-62, 198-99).)

It

goes almost

without saying, however, that

if a

defense inspection conﬁrmed what the ofﬁcer testiﬁed

about the rivets and conﬁrmed What the state’s and defense Witnesses
ignition,

all

said about the

such an inspection would not generate exculpatory evidence.

Sarbacher does not claim that he presented any evidence that the condition 0f the
truck

he

was any

cite t0

different than

any ﬁndings

What various Witnesses,

that access t0 the truck

would have generated impeachment 0r

otherwise exculpatory evidence. In other words, there

ﬁnding 0f fact

that the lost evidence

and defense, claimed. Nor does

state

is

n0 independent evidence and n0

was exculpatory, only

that

it

was

potentially useful.

Sarbacher’s argument that Br_ady, and not Youngblood, applies t0 this case

is

Without

foundation.

D.

Sarbacher Did Not Prove

Bad

Bad Faith, And The District Court Found An Absence Of

Faith

“[U]nless a criminal defendant can
t0 preserve potentially useful evidence

Arizona

V.

show bad

faith

ﬁnd this an act ofbad faith on the part 0fthe
found by the

police, failure

does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 5 1, 58 (1988). The

legal standard to the facts

on the part of the

district court stated that

State.” (R., p. 199.) Application

district court

shows

it

“does not

of the correct

that Sarbacher did not

show

a

Violation of his due process rights.

Sarbacher claims that he
brief, pp. 15-17.)

is

This argument

entitled to a

is

both wrong and irrelevant. Before Youngblood, the

Idaho Supreme Court employed a three part

governmental destruction 0f evidence. Stuart

792 (1995)

(citing Paradis V. State,

presumption 0f materiality. (Respondent’s

test t0

due process claims arising from

V. State,

127 Idaho 806, 815, 907 P.2d 783,

110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986)). “The Paradis

test

looks at ‘(1) whether the evidence

0f punishment;

(2)

was

Whether the defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the

evidence; and (3) Whether the government
lost the

evidence.”

reconciling the

material t0 the question of guilt or the degree

was

Li. (quoting Paradis,

good

acting in

110 Idaho

faith

at 539,

When

716 P.2d

two standards, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded

it

destroyed or
1311).

In

that “materiality

and

at

prejudice to the defense can be presumed where the government acts in badfaith.”

127 Idaho

P.3d

at

at 816,

907 P.2d

at

793 (emphasis added).

568 (“Where the value of the evidence

is

E

alﬂ Le_wis, 144 Idaho

at 67,

156

m

unknown, the materiality and prejudice

elements are presumed and the inquiry focuses 0n the presence of bad faith”);

Edﬂ,

M,

145 Idaho 694, 696, 183 P.3d 782, 784 (Ct. App. 2008) (court presumes materiality

and focuses on bad

reasonable probability
the proceeding

“Under a Brady claim, evidence

faith).

that,

had the evidence been disclosed

would have been

different.”

is

material if there

is

t0 the defense, the result

State V. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 505,

P.3d 804, 832 (2017) (emphasis original, internal quotations omitted). Thus,

a

0f

399

if the state

destroys evidence in bad faith the law presumes a reasonable probability the evidence

would have

As

affected the

outcome of the

the above-cited cases

destruction or loss 0f evidence

faith.

faith

E

constitute a denial 0f

make

clear,

t0

show

a due process Violation from

ofunknown exculpatory value the defendant must show bad

alﬂ Youngblood, 488

0n the part 0f the

trial.

U.S. at 58 (“unless a criminal defendant can

show bad

police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not

due process 0f law”). Sarbacher

is

not entitled to a presumption of

materiality absent such a showing, Stuart, 127 Idaho at 816,

907 P.2d

at 793,

and even

if

the presumption applied

bad

it is

insufﬁcient to

show a due process

Violation in the absence of

faith.

Sarbacher also contends the exculpatory value 0f the evidence was immediately
apparent.

(Respondent’s

evidence supporting this claim.

evidence? The

17-18.)

brief, pp.

district court

As shown

above, Sarbacher presented n0

Nor does Sarbacher claim 0n appeal that he presented such

did not

ﬁnd

that access t0 the truck

would have

resulted in

acquisition of exculpatory evidence. (R., pp. 147-50, 197-99.) Sarbacher’s argument that

the district court

may be afﬁrmed on

factual

ﬁndings

it

never made, and that would have

been clearly erroneous because n0 evidence was admitted to support them,
Finally, Sarbacher argues

This argument

fails

factual ﬁndings.

p.

199.)

because

The

Although

judgment 0f a

is

would require

district court

this

Court

erroneous factual ﬁndings,
(2014), the state

it

he proved bad

faith.

this

(Respondent’s

Court in

its

to

reverse a district court where

ﬂ, gg, Stibal V. Fano,

without merit.

brief, pp. 19-21.)

appellate capacity to

found that Sarbacher had failed

may

is

prove bad
it

Nor has Sarbacher

because
cited t0

its

clearly

t0

afﬁrm the

ﬁndings of fact are clearly erroneous.

any such

case.

He

invokes the “right—result, wrong-

theory” rule. (Respondent’s brief, p. 19 n.13 (citing State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

443 P.3d 231, 236-40 (2019).) This rule

2

(R.,

157 Idaho 428, 435, 337 P.3d 587, 594

unaware 0f any precedent allowing an appellate court

district court

faith.

made

has

make

“is generally

phrased

as:

_,

‘Where an order of a

Sarbacher invokes the rule that missing portions of the record are presumed t0 support

the district court’s decision in relation t0 the prosecutor’s representation that photographs

0f the truck were taken by the investigating ofﬁcer (Respondent’s brief, pp. 17-18), but
then immediately admits that nothing in the record or transcript shows that the photographs
were admitted as evidence (Respondent’s brief, p. 17, n.1 1). Sarbacher has failed t0 show
that the appellate record does not contain all the evidence considered

8

by the

district court.

lower court

is

correct, but

the correct theory.”

based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be afﬁrmed upon

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

(emphasis added, quoting Andre

V.

_,

443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019)

Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359

A

This rule therefore applies to alternative legal theories, not alternative facts.

(1984)).

rule that the trial court should be

would be a strange
claiming that the

afﬁrmed where

it

got both the law and the facts

rule 0f appellate review indeed. Sarbacher has not

district court

should be afﬁrmed because

its

factual

wrong

shown any basis

for

ﬁndings were clearly

erroneous.

Even

if there

were a “wrong-facts,

clear error in the district court’s

ﬁnding

court found that Sarbacher had failed t0

t0 allege,

is

must

less

show, that the

right result” rule, Sarbacher has failed t0

was not proven. Here

bad

faith

show bad

faith.

that

district court’s

(R., p. 199.)

show

the district

Sarbacher has failed

determination he failed t0

show bad

faith

contrary t0 the evidence.

Sarbacher presented no evidence
5, Ls. 1

—

p. 6, L. 6.)

He

at the

hearing on his motion.

its

owner.

1

9 Tr., p.

presented n0 afﬁdavits With his motion. (R., pp. 160-66.) The

motion was apparently decided exclusively upon the
released t0

(E 6/28/

(E, gg,

R., pp.

tacit stipulation that the truck

177-82 (prosecution’s objection t0 motion to

dismiss, including factual representations); 6/28/19 TL, p.

13,

L.

15

(prosecution’s argument at hearing, including factual representations).)

parties’ factual representations, the district court

released from ISP’s custody

mere days

found that

after the State’s ﬁrst

prior to the preliminary hearing, providing

was

“[i]t

—

p.

17,

L.

9

Based upon the

appears that the truck was

response to discovery and just

no opportunity for Sarbacher t0 examine 0r fully

investigate the evidence against him,” but did “not

ﬁnd this an

act

0f bad

faith

on the part

0f the State.”
court’s ﬁrst

(R., p.

199 (emphasis added).) While the

ﬁnding of fact

(that the truck

was released

state

to

does not challenge the

its

owner “days

after the State’s

ﬁrst response to discovery and just prior t0 the preliminary hearing”) there

in the record

in

bad

even suggesting error in the second ﬁnding of fact

faith).

district

is

no evidence

(that this release

was not

Sarbacher’s failure t0 provide evidence supports the district court’s

conclusion that he failed in his burden 0f proving bad

faith.

Sarbacher argues the timing of the release 0f the truck was alone sufﬁcient to carry
his

burden of proof. (Respondent’s

brief, pp. 19-21.)

“extremely short Window” between the

start

Speciﬁcally, he contends that the

0f discovery and the release 0f the truck “did

not afford him a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the State’s

initial

much

so as t0 even determine What evidence needed t0 be investigated,

have a meaningful opportunity
evidence.”

(Respondent’s

to actually

brief, p. 19.)

discovery disclosures
less t0 actually

conduct a meaningful investigation of that

However, had the

provided Sarbacher “a

state

meaningful opportunity to actually conduct a meaningful investigation of [the] evidence,”
there

would be n0

call t0

conduct any Youngblood inquiry because he would have had the

evidence. Sarbacher’s argument shows only that

The

facts

53.

stains

faith.

In that case police collected the Victim’s clothing,

from the sexual

assault,

I_d.

Police arrested

steps t0 preserve the

Youngblood 0n December 9, 1983.

10

at

52-

The

ﬁrst testing

at 54.

One of the

Li. at 53.

was “What might have been shown by

not

semen evidence 0n the

0f the semen stains on the clothing was performed in January, 1985.
principle issues at trial

is

Which had

on October 29, 1983. Youngblood, 488 U.S.

The police did not refrigerate or take other

clothing.

applies to his claim.

of Youngblood show that the timing 0f the loss of evidence

determinative 0f bad

semen

Youngblood

I_d.

tests

performed on the

samples shortly

after they

the boy’s clothing

In

were gathered, or by

later tests

had the clothing been properly

Youngblood

before the defendant

performed on the samples from

refrigerated.” Li.

the acts 0r omissions causing the destruction 0f evidence occurred

was even

arrested.

Youngblood

certainly did not

have “a meaningful

opportunity t0 actually conduct a meaningful investigation 0fthat evidence” (Respondent’s

brief, p. 19), yet that

alone did not

show bad

cases ﬁnding no bad faith the defendant

faith.

Indeed, in

many Idaho Youngblood

was not given “a meaningful opportunity

to

evaluate the State’s initial discovery disclosures so as to even determine What evidence

needed t0 be investigated, much

less t0 actually

have a meaningful opportunity

conduct a meaningful investigation of that evidence.” (Respondent’s

gg,

to actually

brief, p. 19.)

E,

State V. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 169-70, 125 P.3d 522, 525-26 (2005) (at the time of

arrest “citing ofﬁcers

dumped out the

contents 0f, and then threw away, the can and bottles

containing the alcoholic beverages” that formed the basis of minor in possession charges);
State V. Greathouse, 119 Idaho 732, 733,

810 P.2d 266, 267

(Ct.

App. 1991) (dispatch tape

destroyed “although requested” in discovery); State V. Bryant, 127 Idaho 24, 27, 896 P.2d
350, 353 (Ct. App. 1995) (claim that “state’s mishandling of the gun effectively deprived

Bryant of any opportunity” to conduct ﬁngerprint

Casselman, 141 Idaho

at

594,

114 P.3d at152 (ofﬁcer “unable t0 retrieve” photographs of domestic Violence Victim

after

downloading them
P.3d 782, 783

(Ct.

at

testing);

time ﬁled police report); State

V.

Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 695, 183

App. 2008) (evidence taken from methamphetamine production lab

destroyed before ﬁngerprint evidence was gathered). The timing of the release of the truck
to its rightful

owner did not alone show

“‘a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure

requirements’ under Brady.” Lewis, 144 Idaho at 67, 156 P.3d at 568 (quoting California

11

V.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984)).

ﬁnding

that

he failed to prove bad

Sarbacher’s argument that the district court’s

faith is clearly

evidence, and the timing of the release found

faith as

deﬁned

The

applied the

fails

because he presented n0

implicit stipulation does not

show bad

in the law.

district

Youngblood

by

erroneous

court erred

standard.

m

when

it

applied the Br_ady standard instead of the

Sarbacher’s arguments that the district court did not err

when

it

standard are without legal merit. His arguments that he should prevail

under the proper Youngblood standard are Without foundation in the record. Because the
district court

applied an incorrect legal standard, and application 0f the correct legal

standard to the facts found
in granting Sarbacher’s

by the

motion

court requires the opposite result, the district court erred

to dismiss.

CONCLUSION
The
remand

state requests this court t0 reverse the district court’s order

dismissing and t0

for further proceedings.

DATED this 8th day 0f April, 2020.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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